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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROBERT 0. CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

11003

gr_t'HEL T. CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO
'rHE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
'l1he Petitioner respectfully requests a rehearing in
the above entitled cause and that the decision be modified
a~ hereinafter suggested, for the reason and upon the
ground following:
In affirming the trial court's denial of alimony to
Uir Defendant, the decision of this Court failed to make
1011eh arrangements of property and economic resources
of the parties that they will have the best opportunity
to reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful basis.

2

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully submits that
a rehearing should be had and the decision revised, be
lieving that a re-examination of the record will assist tlit
Court better to understand the record certified, and will
result in a revision and reversal of the decision herein.
Respectfully submitted,

MOFFAT, IVERSON &
TAYLOR

BY------------------------------------············
J. Grant Iverson
Attorneys for Petitioner
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ALIMONY TO THE
DEFENDANT FAILS TO MAKE SUCH ARRANGEMENT OF PROPERTY AN D ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF THE PARTIES THAT THEY WILL
HA VE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO RECONSTRUCT THEIR LIVES ON A HAPPY AND USEFUL BASIS.

The appellant (herein ref erred to as the defendant)
respectfully submits that the division of property and
economic resources of the parties in this case by the trial
court and affirmed by this Court does not provide to the
Defendant an opportunity to reconstruct her life on a
happy and useful basis.
As stated in the decision of this Court:
"The money and property to be dealt with is
respectable but not extensive. They own a home
in Bountiful valued at $12,000 to $14,000, with a
balance of $4,000 to be paid in monthly installments of $56.00. Plaintiff has for many years
worked for the U.S. government as an examiner
of savings and loan associations. He has a present salary of about $8,500.00 per year, plus per
diem and mileage, and the Defendant is not employed."
Plaintiff testified that he receives $16.00 per diem
for approximately three-fourths of the days of the year
( R 2:2). rrhis would be 273 days a year. At $16.00 per
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day, this would amount to $4,3G8.00. Thus, plaintiff',
income is $8,500.00, plus $4,368.00, a total of $12,8GS.Oil
a year.
Again, as stated in the decision of this Court:
"The trial court awarded the Defendant the custody of the two minor children, $100.00 each for
their support, a lump sum of $2,400.00 alimon1.
payable at plaintiff's option in monthly instail
ments of $100.00 until paid, the home and it fur.
nishings, her automobile and that the plaintiff
pay certain family debts and pay to the defendant $300.00 for her attorneys' fees."
Thus, there was awarded to the defendant a honw.
with a net equity of from $8,000.00 to $10,000.00, vlu1
$2,400.00 alimony. By now said alimony has all been
paid. The award to the defendant at a maximum amouuti
to $10,000.00 for the home and $2,400.00 for alimon:
This is $468.00 less than the plaintiff's annual income.
The trial court must have assumed, since it found
that the defendant was unemployed, that she would b
forced to sell the home and be obliged to rent anothe1
home. If we assume that the defendant would expen i
$250.00 per month for her living expenses, including rent.
in four years all that has been given to her would b·
expended. She would then be without assets of any kind
During that four years, the Plaintiff's total salary all'
per diem would be $51,472.00.
1

1

The defendant's health is not good (R. 38, 39 au
54). If at any time she is unable to work, after the sa!
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price of the home has been expmded, or if she is unable
to ohtain employment although physically capable, she
will be on relief, while the plaintiff enjoys an mcome
of more than $1,000.00 per month.
Can this be said to be fair and equitableV
A fair and equitable judgment should provide for
wme alimony to be payable to her, if only nominal,
until the proceeds of the sale of the home are expended.
lf at that time it is established that she must be taken·
eare of either by the plaintiff or by public relief, a trial
court can fix a reasonable amount for her care. (See
McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2d 1066).
ls anything less than this fair and equitable to afford
her "the best opportunity to reconstruct her life on a
liappy and useful basis"~
In the case of DeRose vs. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77,
+2G P. 2d 221, decided by this court in April, 1967, the
assets and income of the parties were very similar to
the assets and income of the parties in this case. In
that case, the plaintiff's wages were $340.00 per month,
with take-home pay of approximately $300.00 per month,
the defendant's income was approximately $1,000.00 per
month, the parties had a home with a mortgage thereon
of $8,788,000, which represented a major portion of the
value of the home. The trial court awarded to the plaintiff all stock acquired during the marriage (no value
shown), all household furniture, fixtures, tools, and
PffUijmwnt, a 1956 Chevrolet station wagon, one-half of
tlwir $4,250.00 bank account, and the family home, upon
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the condition that she be required to assume a mortgage
of $8,788.00 thereon and make the payments of $97.0r1
per month until the mortgage shonld be paid, and that
at the time the youngest child should reach majorit\,
was out of college, or plaintiff remarried, the home
should be sold and the defendant rece1ive one-half (11
the equity of the parties in the home as of Septcmbec
1965.
The defendant was awarded his equity in the ltollH'.
one-half of the bank account of $4,250.00, and his 196:;
Monza automobile.
The court ordered the defendant to pay $150.011
per month each as support money for the two children.
and $50.00 per month alimony.
This court affirmed the action of the trial court.
except that the equity of the husband in the home wm
awarded to the plaintiff instead of the defendant.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff, with an income o:
$2,868.00 a year more than that of the defendant in the
DeRose case, is ordered only to pay $2,400.00 alimony
$100.00 per month child support, and loses his equity~
the home. The $2,400.00 alimony has already been pai•
at $100.00 per month. If Mrs. DeRose was entitled t1
receive $50.00 per month alimony, why should the <l1
fendant in this case be denied all alimony?
It is indicated in the decision of this Court th:i
the guilt of the defendant probably accounts for the fai,
ure of the trial court to reasonably provide for the d·
fendant. It is stated thus:
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''This is also true of the relative guilt, or perhaps better stated, the greater responsibility one
spouse may appear to have than the other for
bringing about the failure of the marriage. This
seems to have been quite definitely true in the
instant case."
The appellant submits that the evidence of the
plaintiff alone, without considering the evidence of the
dt>fendant, does not support a finding that she was guilty
or had the greater responsibility for bringing about the
failure of the marriage. Throughout the trial, she stated
that she did not want a divorce, that she was willing
to make an effort to make a happy home, and that she
considered marriage sacred (R. 44-45). She stated: "I
honestly tried to make things better." (R. 46) This accounts for her refusal to relate his shortcomings. He,
on the other hand, evidenced his attitude when he stated:
"I have no intention of ever spending a minute
with that woman." (R. 10)
"I haven't been in the house for two years."
(R. 27)
As stated in the opinion of this court, the grounds
for granting him a divorce were the following:
"The defendant had caused him great mental distress in provoking quarrels, in quarreling with
him and with the children, in continually belittling
him in various ways and as a provider for the
family, and in failing to properly discharge her
duties in the home."
It is true that he made bald, general statements
~up1Jorting the above quotation, but when considered
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with all of his evidence, his testimony does not suppor:
the stated grounds.
In the first trial ( R. 7), he stated :
"We have both over a great many years worker!
up an antipathy toward each other - name-callin"
and just hard feelings, and constant fighting an;
bickering."
At the second hearing, he was asked who starfo:
the quarrels, to which he answered:
"Well, I would say that she would. She wouk
probably contend that I would start them." (R. 6
He stated throughout the trial that their main diffi
culty concerned their finances. He stated:
"I would say that she was an erratic spender, a
compulsive spender. While she didn't spe11i
money on herself, she was very free with th
children and giftgiving, things for the house, anr:
I didn't think she was a manager at alL W
shifted the responsibility of the money back ani
forth. Never has been successful. Neither of u~
could manage the money very well according [,
the other." (R. 6)
1

He stated in answer to a question of how frequent!
they would quarrel:

"It seems like it was a daily occurrence. Hardi:
a day went by but what there wasn't arguing aD'
yelling, screaming back and forth and name-cat:
ing, mostly on my part, because I was incited 1
wrath, I would say." (R. 8)
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Concerning the matter of belittling the plaintiff as
a provider, when asked what he meant bv. belittlin(J'
in
0
public he stated:
e1]

ll"

'

Ill]

"I can't give you examples, specific examples.
However, when we would go out to dinner there
would always be snide little cutting remarks directed at me."
His attorney then stated to him:

1k
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''You have got to be specific. You have got to tell
me what they were and what she said, or the
substance."

Ji

"A. I am unable to do that. I am sorry. I can't.
So many years have gone by since I have ever
been in the house." (R. 12)

'a

"Q. Has Mrs. Christensen ever used abusive language toward you~

'11i

"A. No, she has not, but I have toward her. I am
sure of that." (R. 12)

W 'rhe plaintiff was asked the following question and gave
ill
the following answer:
\]•

. [,

l.

di:

n·

l

i

''But as far as you can answer us, Mr. Christensen, the quarreling was over money, and you and
she both started those matters, is that correct?
"A. That is right." (R. 29-30)
'l1he only specific evidence that he gave concerning
lwr extravagances was the purchase of a jacket for the
~on, Hobert. On cross-examination he stated that they
had an argument over said jacket; that she wanted to
i 1ay more than was necessary. He \Vas asked if he was
aware that four years after that jacket was purchased,
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it was still in use, and if he thought she paid too muc1
for it, and he answered, "No." (R. 30, 31)
His testimony is wholly lacking in any particular,
concerning the matter of "snide, little remarks" an,
extravagances and other matters of which he so bitter!·.
complained.
The fact is, as established by his testimony, tb
he is the guilty party in this matter, not she. Her con
duct has in all respects been much better than his.
As to her failing to properly discharge her duties in
the home, he testified that many times during their mar
ried life she had been employed full time (R. 17), ann
that she had been a housewife and had worked at the sanit
time (R. 17-18). He gave no evidence that he ever ai
sisted her in keeping the home.
Can a woman who works all day long to help sup
port the family, and after work attempts to maintait
a home for five children, her husband and herself, bi
divorced if she does not keep an immaculate home 1
In the opinion of this court, the following is con
tained:
"Even though it is the established rule that di
vorce cases being in equity, it is the duty of tlu:
court to review and weigh the evidence, it 1•
equally true that we have invariably recognize'
the advantaged position of the trial judge a111
1
given deference to his findings and judgmen
declaring that they should not be upset unless tli
evidence clearly preponderates against them, l1
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unless the decree works such an injustice that
t>qnity and good conscience demand that it be
revised."
Does the position of the trial judge give him an
advantage when the testimony of one party alone is
considered~

That advantaged position aids him in de-

termining who is telling the truth when conflicting testimony of two or more witnesses is being considered. If
the evidence of only one party is being considered and
evidence of the other party is not considered, the advantage of the trial judge disappears. The appellate
court in such circumstances is in as good position to
determine what is fair and equitable as the trial court.
Considering the plaintiff's testimony alone above
delineated and judgment of the trial court affirmed by
this court, can it be said that in equity and good conscience the decree works no

injustice~

'l'he following quotation from Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg,
77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 at 217 is apropos:
"The question thus is as to whether on the facts
found the division and allowance were equitable
and just. As to that, a divorce proceeding being
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an action in equity, the parties, under the const
tution are entitled to our judgment, as well a
that of the trial court. Constitution of Utah, Ar
8, Sec. 9." Numerous other cases cited.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully requests that her pelt
tion for a rehearing and reconsideration of this matte
be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, IVERSON &
TAYLOR

By ········································
J. Grant Iverson
Attorneys for Petitioner

